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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
WAIN ALLEN POINDEXTER, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
          NOS. 43236, 43237 & 43238 
 
          Twin Falls County Case Nos.  
          CR-2014-8798, CR-2006-8882   
          & CR-2007-7903 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
ISSUES 
 
1. Should Poindexter’s appeal in case number 43236 be dismissed because he 
waived his right to appeal his sentence? 
 
2. Has Poindexter failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking his probation in case numbers 43237 and 43238? 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
In case number 43237, Poindexter pled guilty to possession of 
methamphetamine and the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with 
two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Poindexter on supervised 
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probation for three years.  (R., pp.216-18, 252-61.)  Less than six months later, in 
September 2007, Poindexter’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging that 
Poindexter had violated the conditions of his probation by being arrested for grand theft 
by possession of stolen property (resulting in the conviction in case number 43238) and 
failing to report his contact with law enforcement to his probation officer.  (R., pp.264-65, 
609-11, 655-60.)  Approximately one month later, in October 2007, Poindexter’s 
probation officer filed an addendum to the report of violation, alleging that Poindexter 
had violated the conditions of his probation by again being arrested for grand theft by 
possession of stolen property.  (R., pp.280-81.)  In December 2007, Poindexter’s 
probation officer filed another report of violation, alleging that Poindexter had violated 
the conditions of his probation by failing to enter Drug Court as ordered, failing to 
complete any of his community service hours, testing positive for methamphetamine in 
October 2007, testing positive for THC in November 2007, and testing positive for 
methamphetamine and THC in December 2007.  (R., pp.294-96.)   
Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Poindexter pled guilty to grand theft by 
possession of stolen property in case number 43238 and admitted that he had violated 
the conditions of his probation in case number 43237 by being charged with the new 
crime of grand theft by possession of stolen property, failing to complete Drug Court as 
ordered, and using illegal drugs, and the state agreed to dismiss the second grand theft 
by possession of stolen property case and to withdraw the allegations in the October 
2007 report of probation violation.  (R., pp.313, 609-11, 633, 643.)  In case number 
43238, the district court imposed a consecutive unified sentence of 10 years, with two 
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.655-60.)  In case number 43237, the 
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district court revoked Poindexter’s probation, ordered the underlying sentence executed, 
and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.318-27.)  Following the period of retained jurisdiction, 
the district court suspended Poindexter’s sentences in case numbers 43237 and 43238 
and placed him on supervised probation for three years.  (R., pp.333-42, 670-77.)   
Less than six months later, in February 2009, Poindexter’s probation officer filed 
a progress report advising that Poindexter had committed a new misdemeanor crime by 
removing scrap metal from another individual’s property without permission.  (R., 
pp.345, 678.)  Poindexter’s probation officer noted, “This is the third event of removing 
property without permission.”  (R., pp.345, 678.)   
On November 9, 2009, Poindexter’s probation officer filed a report of violation 
alleging that Poindexter had violated the conditions of his probation by failing to make 
any payments toward his restitution for over nine months; consuming alcohol; using 
marijuana in January, July, and October 2009; and using methamphetamine in January 
and September 2009.  (R., pp.349-51, 682-84.)  On November 24, 2009, Poindexter’s 
probation officer filed another report of violation, alleging that Poindexter had violated 
the conditions of his probation by being charged with the new crime of possession of 
paraphernalia, using marijuana in November 2009, and possessing a baggie containing 
a white residue that tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine.  (R., pp.371-73, 
707-09.)  On January 26, 2010, Poindexter’s probation officer filed yet another report of 
violation, alleging that Poindexter had violated the conditions of his probation by using 
marijuana in January 2010 and failing to appear for UA testing on two separate 
occasions.  (R., pp.391-94, 728-30.)  Poindexter admitted that he had violated the 
conditions of his probation by consuming alcohol and by using methamphetamine and 
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marijuana on multiple occasions.  (R., pp. 347, 385, 392, 405, 743.)  The district court 
revoked Poindexter’s probation, ordered his underlying sentences executed, and 
retained jurisdiction a second time.  (R., pp.423-27, 764-68.)  Following the period of 
retained jurisdiction, the district court again suspended Poindexter’s sentences and 
placed him on supervised probation for four years.  (R., pp.441-60, 775-94.)   
In August 2014, Poindexter’s probation officer filed a report of violation in case 
numbers 43237 and 43238 alleging that Poindexter had violated the conditions of his 
probation by failing to pay his cost of supervision, refusing to submit to UA testing, 
failing to pay his court-ordered financial obligations, and being charged with the new 
crimes of grand theft and injury to canal in case number 43236.  (R., pp.66-68, 477-79, 
810-12.)  Poindexter admitted the allegations and the district court finally revoked his 
probation and ordered the underlying sentences executed in case numbers 43237 and 
43238.  (R., pp.500, 523-28, 833, 868-73.)  Poindexter filed notices of appeal timely 
from the district court’s orders revoking probation in case numbers 43237 and 43238.  
(R., pp.529-32, 874-77.)   
In case number 43236, pursuant to a plea agreement, Poindexter entered an 
Alford1 plea to grand theft and the state agreed to dismiss the injury to canal charge and 
to recommend a concurrent unified sentence of 14 years, with seven years fixed.  (R., 
p.66-68, 71, 83.)  As part of the plea agreement, Poindexter waived his right to appeal 
his sentence unless the district court exceeded the determinate portion of the state’s 
sentencing recommendation.  (R., p.71.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence 
of 14 years, with seven years fixed, and ordered that it run concurrently with 
                                            
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Poindexter’s sentences in case numbers 43237 and 43238.2  (R., pp.122-28, 140-46.)  
Poindexter filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction in case 
number 43236.  (R., pp.129-32.)   
On appeal, Poindexter asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence in case number 43236 and by revoking his probation in 
case numbers 43237 and 43238.  (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)  The record supports the 
district court’s decisions.   
 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Poindexter’s Appeal In Case Number 43236 Should Be Dismissed Because He Waived 
The Right To Appeal His Sentence 
 
“Mindful of the fact that [he] waived his right to appeal his sentence in the 2014 
grand theft case,” Poindexter nevertheless asserts that his sentence in case number 
43236 is excessive in light of his community support, acceptance of responsibility and 
purported remorse, and mental health issues.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-10.)  Poindexter’s 
appeal in case number 43236 should be dismissed because he specifically waived his 
right to appeal his sentence when he entered into the plea agreement.   
The waiver of the right to appeal as a component of a plea agreement is valid 
and will be enforced if it was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.  State v. 
Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994).    
                                            
2 Poindexter was originally sentenced on December 5, 2014; however, pursuant to a 
stipulation for re-sentencing, Poindexter was granted a new sentencing hearing and he 
was re-sentenced before a different judge on February 13, 2015.  (R., pp.91-97, 109, 
121-28, 504-09, 518, 523-28, 837-42, 852-56, 862, 867-73.)   
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On appeal, Poindexter acknowledges that he waived his right to appeal his 
sentence in case number 43236.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  Indeed, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, signed by Poindexter, Poindexter waived his right to appeal his sentence as 
long as the district court did not exceed the seven-year determinate portion of the 
state’s sentencing recommendation.  (R., p.71.)  At the guilty plea hearing, the district 
court specified that, as part of the plea agreement, Poindexter was waiving his right to 
appeal his sentence.  (10/20/14 Tr., p.6, L.23 – p.7, L.2.)  The district court 
subsequently found that Poindexter had entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently, and Poindexter has not challenged that determination on appeal.  (R., p.83; 
10/20/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.11-17.)  At sentencing, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of 14 years, with seven years fixed.  (R., pp. 122-28, 140-46.)  Because the 
district court did not exceed the state’s recommendation, Poindexter did not retain his 
right to appeal.  To allow an appellate challenge in these circumstances would allow 
Poindexter to evade the appeal waiver in his plea agreement.  Because Poindexter 
specifically waived his right to appeal his sentence, he cannot challenge his sentence 
on appeal and his appeal in case number 43236 should be dismissed. 
 
II. 
Poindexter Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Revoking His Probation In Case Numbers 43237 And 43238 
 
Poindexter asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his 
probation in case numbers 43237 and 43238, in light of his mental health issues, his 
employment while on probation, and his claim that he “tested clean of controlled 
substances for most of that period.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-12.)  There are two 
reasons why Poindexter’s argument fails.  First, Poindexter’s claim of an abuse of 
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sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error.  Second, even if this 
Court reviews the merits of Poindexter’s claim, he has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion   
A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a 
ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was 
error.  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000).  The 
purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who “caused or played an 
important role in prompting a trial court” to take a particular action from “later 
challenging that decision on appeal.”  State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 
120 (1999).  This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during 
trial.  State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).  
At the February 13, 2015 disposition hearing for Poindexter’s probation 
violations, Poindexter’s counsel advised: 
…[N]o matter how much the defendant or his family or his friends 
might like him to see the light of day, we acknowledge that’s not 
appropriate.  We’re not seeking a probation, nor are we seeking retained 
jurisdiction; and so though [sic] the single question presented before this 
court is, as far as prison is concerned, what is an appropriate sentence, 
and we acknowledge that.   
 
And I know Mr. Poindexter, in speaking to him, acknowledges that 
it’s – that it’s his poor decisions that have led to this hearing here today, 
and it’s also his poor decisions that have or will lead to his imprisonment; 
and he understands that. 
 
(2/13/15 Tr., p.20, L.12 – p.21, L.1.)  The district court subsequently stated: 
…[C]learly, when considering what I have to in the probation cases, 
it is whether probation is achieving the rehabilitative goals and whether 
continued probation is consistent in protecting society.  I think that’s why 
everyone here recognizes those things just aren’t working; and so my 
decision in each of those cases is simply to revoke and impose the 
sentences.   
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(2/13/15 Tr., p.31, Ls.9-17.)  Because Poindexter consented to the district court’s 
decision to revoke his probation and order his underlying sentences executed, he 
cannot claim on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by doing exactly that.  
Therefore, Poindexter’s claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the 
doctrine of invited error.   
Even if this Court considers the merits of Poindexter’s claim, he has still failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion.  “Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of 
the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4).  The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound 
discretion of the district court.  State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 
(Ct. App. 1987); State v. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 When deciding whether to revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether 
the probation [was] achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the 
protection of society.”  Drennen, 122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701. 
At the February 13, 2015 disposition hearing for Poindexter’s probation 
violations, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its 
decision and also set forth its reasons for revoking Poindexter’s probation and ordering 
the underlying sentences executed.  (2/13/15 Tr., p.28, L.20 – p.31, L.17.)  The state 
submits that Poindexter has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more 
fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the 
state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)   
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CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Poindexter’s appeal in case 
number 43236 and to affirm the district court’s orders revoking probation in case 
numbers 43237 and 43238. 
       
 DATED this 9th day of March, 2016. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of March, 2016, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to: 
 
SALLY J. COOLEY  
  DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming __________ 
     LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General    
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State of Idaho v. Wain Allen Poindexter Transcript on Appeal Docket Nos. 43236, 43237, 43238 
1 there, it's not -- it's bad. But -- I'm in 
2 pain every day. I just ask the court to use 
3 their discretion. That's all I can say is I'm 
4 sorry. That's really about all I have to say. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
6 Well, counsel, and particularly 
7 Mr. Poindexter and family, I haven't been 
8 acquainted with you over the period of time 
9 that you have been before the court at all, 
10 really. I mean, you may have appeared in front 
11 of me for an admit/deny hearing here or there, 
12 a brief moment; but I haven't lived these cases 
13 like Judge Stoker did prior to his recusal in 
14 this case. So I have gone back and tried to 
15 just educate myself to the history, 
16 Mr. Poindexter, of what's gone on and so I, at 
17 least, had a fairly satisfactory understanding 
18 in my own mind of where you have been and what 
19 brought you here. 
20 Really, this is a fairly 
21 straight-forward decision now, as I understand 
22 the arguments of counsel and your own 
23 recognition of where you are and where you find 
24 yourself. It's really a question of whether 
25 the new case fixed time should be five or 
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1 factors that are laid out in the statute, you 
2 know, like what's your history, what have you 
3 done in the past, how have you responded to 
4 rehabilitative efforts, what is it that's 
5 caused you to be here, what makes you tick as 
6 an individual. And it is, to me, much like 
7 your attorney said, unfathomable, really, or 
B very hard for me to figure out why, why you're 
9 back here, because you have people in the 
10 community that talk so highly of you, as a good 
11 person with a good heart, a family who rely on 
12 you; and yet, for whatever reason, throughout 
13 your life you have victimized individuals in 
14 society over and over again, over 30 times at a 
15 misdemeanor level. That could be anything from 
16 stealing a pack of gun to stealing something 
17 worth the $999. But to think through and 
18 engage in that and get caught at it over 30 
19 times just leaves me scratching my head. 
20 And then there's on the felony level. 
21 We are here on our ninth felony. You have been 
22 given two riders, shown fairly significant 
23 leniency, I felt, in reading the file, going 
24 all the way back to 2007, in two riders, t he 
25 five probation violations, leading to this 
30 
Virg inia M. Bailey, RPR, CSR No. 262 
1 seven years. And in making these kinds of 
2 decisions, you would think that would just be a 
3 fairly easy decision; but it really isn't, 
4 Mr. Poindexter, because of the fact that I have 
5 t ried to weigh t he elements I am to consider in 
6 19-2521 of the Idaho Code and to your history 
7 from an objective viewpoint of one who hasn't, 
8 as I've said, known you until today, really, to 
9 hear from you and to consider those things that 
10 have been brought to me by way of argument from 
11 your attorney. 
12 I recognize that health is an issue, 
13 that can mitigate against a sentence 
14 particularly on one like this. I take that at 
15 least into account; but I also recognize really 
16 the tragedy in this case is, as you've said, 
17 t he collateral damage of it, not so much to you 
18 but to your mother who is fairly old and to 
19 your fiance. And in that regard, those are the 
20 people that probably, I feel -- I don't know if 
21 I'd say I feel sorry for them, but I certainly 
22 have empathy for their circumstances before the 
23 court today. 
24 In terms of your own perspective and 
25 where you are, we judges try to look at the 
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1 crime and why we are here today on the latest 
2 allegations of probation violation. There has 
3 been some drug use, alcohol use, over that 
4 period of time. But if we look at the 2006 
5 case, there were two new grand thefts that 
6 occurred while that case was pending: the one 
7 back in September of '07 and then the one now 
B that we are here on for the new charge today. 
9 So clearly, when considering what I have 
10 to in the probation cases, it is whether 
11 probation is achieving rehabilitative goals and 
12 whether continued probation is consistent in 
13 protecting society. I think that's why 
14 everyone here recognizes t hose things just 
15 aren't working; and so my decision in each of 
16 those cases is simply to revoke and impose the 
17 sentences. 
18 In the '06 case, the five years with two 
19 fixed, three indeterminate, credit you for all 
20 t ime served since your latest arrest, which, by 
21 my calculation, is 184 days ago. 
22 In the '07 case, I impose the 10 years, 
23 with two fixed, eight indeterminate, 
24 consecutive to CR 06-8882. 
25 You're credited for time served. A new 
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